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ABSTRACT 
First vs. Third Degree Price Discrimination in the Laboratory. (May 2013) 
Matthew Liu 
Department of 
Economics 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Alex Brown 
Department of 
Economics 
 
Differential pricing is a contentious issue within the business environment. The public’s reaction 
to price discrimination varies widely from discontent to indifference. I hypothesize that buyers 
who do not benefit from price discrimination will perceive that it is unfair and reject 
discriminatory offers from sellers. Using a laboratory experiment, I use differing degrees of price 
discrimination to test the validity of this prediction. I represent buyer and seller interactions with 
a modified version of the ultimatum game to model consumers’ perception of fairness. I find that 
the treatment effect is not significant in determining how buyers will behave. In addition, sellers 
price higher in third degree situations that in first degree situations. My results indicate that 
consumers are unlikely to change their behavior in the face of price discrimination even when 
sellers price aggressively. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Price discrimination is a fairly common occurrence. The strategy of charging customers different 
prices for the same item goes even farther back than newspaper coupons and student discounts at 
movie theaters. As commerce begins moving to the internet, price discrimination will become an 
increasing concern for both businesses and customers: electronic commerce companies are able 
to mine large amounts of data from their users that allow them to determine individual 
preferences, which in turn allows more elaborate price discrimination schemes. For example, the 
route a customer takes to find the product website might indicate what they're looking for. If the 
customer finds the product through a Google search, they might be searching for an average 
price. However, if they come from a link in a product review, they may be willing to pay more 
because others have vouched for the quality of the product. If they have a history of browsing 
price comparison and bargain sites, the customer may be willing to pay less than the average 
price. Brick and mortar stores in the past have not been able to utilize these strategies, but the 
subject of price discrimination requires greater scrutiny as the ability to do so increases with 
technology. 
 
In this paper, I examine the results of repeated ultimatum game experiments designed to 
resemble first and third degree price discrimination seen in transactions. Specifically, I are 
interested in how participants’ behavior changes between different degrees of price 
discrimination. 
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The Case of Amazon.com and Private Universities 
Many forms of price discrimination are considered undesirable. The Robinson-Patman Act of 
1936 addresses the anticompetitive nature of price discrimination, and federal law expressly 
prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, etc. Other forms of price discrimination are 
unpopular, but less clear under the law. In September of 2000, the website Amazon.com was 
discovered to have engaged in price discrimination (Odlyzko 2003). The company implemented 
a system that used a buyer's browser cookies to identify individual shopping habits in order to 
offer identical items at different prices. The differential pricing structure the practice was 
immediately terminated after the backlash from unhappy consumers, who felt that it was unfairly 
extracting higher profits from loyal customers. 
 
University tuition in the United States serves as a stark contrast to the Amazon example. While 
price discrimination was overwhelmingly unpopular in the previous example, private universities 
in the United States vary their tuition per student based directly on their ability to pay (Odlyzko 
2003). Not only is this practice tolerated, but it is encouraged by the government through the use 
of the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). 
 
With these two examples in mind, I believe there is a common thread of "fairness" that 
determines how individuals perceive price discrimination cases (Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004). 
The difference here is that Amazon users feel that loyal customers are being exploited, while the 
private universities are aided by the federal government in providing a college education to those 
who otherwise might not be able to afford one. 
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Price Discrmination 
An extensive survey on the existing price discrimination literature is given by Armstrong (2006). 
In addition, a look at price discrimination and privacy by Odlyzko (2003) details the history of 
how the practice has evolved and the implications it has for the internet age. 
 
The classifications of first and third degree price discrimination were first discussed by Pigou 
(1929). First degree price discrimination occurs when a monopolist charges a different price on 
each unit based on the maximum price every consumer is willing to pay. In contrast, third degree 
price discrimination is based on using a characteristics or customer segments as a proxy for 
individual willingness to pay. According to Carroll and Coates (1999), there are three necessary 
market conditions for price discrimination: 
a) The firm must have some market power and must not be price takers, implying a negatively 
sloped demand curve. A negatively sloped demand curve means that there is consumer surplus in 
the firm’s transactions. 
b) The firm must control sale of their product. The firm is unable to enact differential pricing if 
unrestricted arbitrage is possible.  
c) Consumers have different price elasticities. When prices are changed by the firm, the quantity 
demanded by each individual must change at different rates, otherwise all consumers are 
identical. 
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The Ultimatum Game 
I use the ultimatum game to model interactions between buyers and sellers (Hoffman et. al 
1994). The differential pricing interaction for between buyers and sellers can be thought of as a 
two part game. In the first part, the seller offers a price or a menu of prices that is shown to the 
buyer. The seller has information on the buyer's preferences and can change his prices 
accordingly. In the second part, the buyer is presented with the price and can choose to accept or 
reject the offer. If the buyer accepts the offer, the seller receives the price of the offer, and the 
buyer receives his or her redemption value of the item minus the price. If the buyer rejects the 
offer, both players receive nothing. 
 
Non-cooperative game theory hypothesizes that the first player in two person bargaining games 
should act to gain as much surplus as possible from the second mover (Fouraker and Siegel 
1963). In my case, theory predicts that sellers will raise price to minimize consumer surplus as 
their ability to accurately price discriminate increases. Contrary to this belief, experimental 
research into the ultimatum game has found that the first mover tends to make a more generous 
offer than the theory would predict (Fouraker and Siegel 1963), ostensibly due to the buyer’s 
refusal to accept offers that are not in the spirit of egalitarianism. This preference for "fairness" is 
well-documented in the ultimatum game and appears to be an integral link between markets and 
social preferences.  
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Price Discrimination and Experimental Studies 
The experiment carried out by Englmaier, Gratz, and Reisinger (2012) uses a similar design to 
ours in order to study reciprocal responses under third degree price discrimination. I depart from 
their study by focusing on fairness rather than reciprocity as well controlling for differing 
degrees of price discrimination. There has been very little experimental research devoted to first 
degree and third degree price discrimination. There is also very little research concerning how 
consumers’ fairness concerns alter the effectiveness of first and third degree price discrimination. 
 
To test whether consumer decisions are affected by the severity of price discrimination, I will 
conduct two experiments that follow the structure of the ultimatum game. In the first treatment 
(D1), sellers will choose a price for each buyer and each item. Since two buyers are assigned to 
each seller, the seller will be picking fmy prices in order to model first degree price 
discrimination. In the second treatment (D3), sellers will only set prices for each item, but not for 
each buyer. This treatment is meant to model third degree price discrimination by having the 
seller only set two prices. I predict that consumers will react to price discrimination and respond 
by rejecting more offers. 
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CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
 
All experiments were conducted at the Economics Research Laboratory at Texas A&M 
University. The computer-based experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fishbacher, 2007) and 
scheduled with the organizational software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).  The subjects were recruited 
from registered undergraduate students. Fifty-fmy subjects participated in two experimental 
sessions, split evenly into two groups of 27, with each subject participating in only one session. 
 
Upon entering the lab, each participant was assigned a random number corresponding to their 
assigned computer station. Upon entering the program, each participant was further randomly 
placed into a role in a randomly assigned group. All instructions were common knowledge. Both 
sets of directions were read aloud by the experimenter as well as displayed on the screen. 
Subjects were divided into groups of two buyers and one seller and played a single interaction 
game over ten periods. The groups of the participants were randomized at the beginning of each 
period, but their roles remained the same after the first period. Redemption values for the buyers 
were predetermined as follows: 
 item A item B 
buyer_l 100 100 
buyer_h 200 50 
[Figure 2.1] Redemption Values for Buyers  
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Seller Decision Stage 
In the first stage, the sellers were given two goods and asked to set prices for the buyers, with the 
knowledge of the predetermined redemption value of both items for each buyer. 
 
[Figure 2.2] Example of a Seller’s Decision Stage 
For treatment D1, sellers were given fmy prices to set, as show in Figure 2.2. In treatment D3, 
sellers were given two prices to set, one for each item. The prices could not be less than 0, or 
greater than 200, intentionally chosen to match the highest redemption value between both 
buyers. The seller received a profit equal to the price if the buyer chose to accept either offer, but 
received nothing if the buyer rejected both. 
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Buyer Decision 
Once sellers selected their prices, each buyer was asked to either pick one of the two offers, or to 
reject bother offers.  
 
[Figure 2.2] Example of a Buyer’s Decision Stage 
The redemption values of each buyer were known to the other buyer in the same table displayed 
to the seller at the top of the screen. In both treatments D1 and D3, all buyers of the same type 
(either l or h) viewed the same decision screen. If the buyer accepted an offer, they would 
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receive a profit of the redemption value of the item minus the price. If both offers were rejected, 
the seller and the buyer would both receive nothing. 
 
Payment Calculation 
The profit for sellers was determined by the price of the item accepted by each buyer, with the 
period’s profit equal to the sum of both prices. The period’s profit for buyers was equal to their 
redemption value for the item they accepted minus the price set by the seller. The buyer’s profit 
would be equal to zero if they chose to reject both offers, and the seller would not receive any 
profit from selling to the buyer. At the end of 10 periods, each individual’s payment was 
calculated by randomly selecting a profit period, and awarding cash based on their performance 
in the randomly selected period. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY 
 
Standard economic models mostly assume that individuals act in their own self-interest. In the 
case of price discrimination, a purely self-interested buyer would engage in any transaction that 
results in a positive outcome for them. However, there is extensive experimental evidence 
showing that consumers are strongly influenced by fairness concerns (Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler 1986). In order to evaluate these fairness concerns, I employ a model for inequity 
aversion from Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to describe the buyer’s behavior. 
𝑈𝑖(𝑥) =  𝑥𝑖 −  𝛼𝑖 1𝑛−1  ∑ max�𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖 , 0�𝑗≠1 −  𝛽𝑖 1𝑛−1∑ max�𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗 , 0�𝑗≠1   
[Figure 3.1] Fehr and Schmidt’s Model of Inequity Aversion 
I take U to represent overall utility, and the first term 𝑥𝑖 to be the monetary payoff for player i. 
The second term represents the utility loss when the individual perceives inequity that puts them 
at a disadvantage. The 𝛼𝑖coefficient represents the individual’s inequity aversion, given the loss 
from disadvantageous inequality (𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖). The third term measures the utility loss when the 
individual perceives inequity that works in their favor. It is nearly identical to the previous term, 
other than that  𝛽𝑖 measures advantageous inequity (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗), which is the inverse of 
disadvantageous inequity. For this study, I assume 𝛽𝑖 = 0 because buyers are not given any 
advantageous inequity in relation to the seller (they are not allowed to set negative prices). 
Without a third term, my model is as follows: 
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𝑈𝑖(𝑥) =  𝑥𝑖 −  𝛼𝑖 1𝑛 − 1 �max�𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖 , 0�
𝑗≠1
 
[Figure 3.2] Fehr and Schmidt Modified 
A buyer’s condition for accepting an offer is that he gains more utility from accepting than he 
would from rejecting. 
𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖) > 𝑈𝑖0(𝑥𝑖) 
[Figure 3.3] Buyer’s Condition for Accepting 
Since the value of (max�𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖 , 0� ≥ 0) in Figure 3.2, the utility of a rejection cannot go below 
zero. Therefore, I can assume 𝑈𝑖0(𝑥𝑖) = 0. Because my independent variable is a binary 
representation of acceptance or rejection, I use the logistic regression model to estimate the 
probability of α. 
𝑃(𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡|𝛼,𝛽,𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) =  𝑒𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖)1 + 𝑒𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖) 
[Figure 3.4] Logistic Model of Buyer’s Decision 
Finally, I model the seller’s decision based on the buyer’s condition for accepting in Figure 3.3. 
Since sellers are pure profit maximizers, I set their utility as equal to their profit. Profit in turn, is 
equal to the probability of an acceptance times the price: 
𝜋 = 𝑃(𝑈𝑖(𝑥) > 0) × 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 
[Figure 3.5] Seller’s Profit Function 
Sellers will set their prices in order to maximize the value of 𝜋 in Figure 3.5. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 
Result 1: The treatment effect was not significant in determining overall buyer behavior. 
A t-test done on the buyers’ decisions by treatment shows that the actions of both buyer_l and 
buyer_h did not vary significantly with different treatments:  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES buyer_h buyer_l 
   
treatment 0 -0.0111 
 (0.0612) (0.0629) 
Constant 0.789*** 0.789*** 
 (0.0967) (0.0994) 
   
Observations 180 180 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
[Figure 4.1] T-tests on Buyer Decisions 
The primary result is that the tests are not consistent with my prediction of a strong response 
from the buyer. Since treatment is not significant in any of the tested ranges, I cannot reject the 
null hypothesis. Confirming this result, I found that subjects in each treatment had very similar 
acceptance rates even when sellers doubled their price in some instances. Furthermore the 
amount of total rejections per period varied little across treatments and the R-squared values are 
equal to 0.000. 
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Since every measure of the data shows no difference in the buyers’ choices between treatments, I 
assume that the treatment effect did not affect the buyer. 
 
Result 2: Third degree price discrimination resulted in higher prices than first degree. 
For the purpose of this test, I used D1 as treatment = 1, and D3 as treatment = 2. I found that a 
higher treatment number led to higher prices, meaning that prices were significantly higher in the 
third degree treatment than in the first degree treatment. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Price 
buyer_h, 
item A 
Price 
buyer_h, 
item B 
Price 
buyer_l, 
item A 
Price 
buyer_l, 
item B 
     
treatment 73.53*** -1.144 1.289 37.51*** 
 (4.734) (2.764) (6.591) (2.306) 
Constant 7.300 84.04*** 151.8*** 6.733* 
 (7.486) (4.371) (10.42) (3.646) 
     
Observations 180 180 180 180 
R-squared 0.575 0.001 0.000 0.598 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
[Figure 4.2] Effect of Treatment on Price 
The series of t-tests shows that only two out of the four prices changed significantly between 
periods. Recalling the redemption values in Figure 2.1 (buyer_h redeems item A for 200, buyer_l 
redeems item B for 100), I find that the prices that vary significantly correspond to the buyers’ 
highest redemption value, and that the sellers played optimally to maximize their profit.  
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In order to play optimally, the sellers set the price of item A to extract the maximum surplus 
from buyer_h. Since the price of item A is too high for buyer_l, he or she is forced to take the 
price charged for item B or reject both.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
The goal of this paper was to study how different degrees of price discrimination affect a buyers’ 
decision to engage in a transaction with the seller. Past literature on the ultimatum game shows 
that fairness is a concern to consumers. My research focused on applying previous experimental 
literature to price discrimination studies to see if consumers reacted to unfair situations in the 
same way. 
 
My findings show that changing between first and third degree price discrimination has no 
significant effect on the buyers’ behavior. This result suggests that buyers are apathetic toward 
fairness in this experimental setting. An explanation for this could be that they behaved in a 
purely selfish way and sought to maximize their profit. This may be because they felt powerless 
to influence a seller’s behavior when the groups were always randomized. Alternatively, the 
presence of a second buyer may have complicated the decision by creating competition. Any 
number of feelings from competition to apathy could have justified accepting a non-zero payoff. 
 
I also found that the sellers priced more optimally in the third degree treatment than the first 
degree treatment. This is evidenced by the higher prices shown in the D3 treatment, controlling 
for buyer actions. There could be a couple of explanations for these results. First, the participants 
in the D1 treatment may have had a harder time discovering their best strategy since they were 
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required to make four decisions instead of two. As a result, they may have not played as 
optimally as the players in the D3 treatment. Second, the structure of the predetermined 
redemption values helped lend itself to successful to an optimal strategy in D3. The preference 
for the goods was divide so that buyer_h had a high redemption value for one item, and a very 
low redemption value for the other item. If the redemption values were changed to make the 
solution less obvious, perhaps the results would be different.  
 
Further research should be done in a number of ways. A lot could be learned by changing 
individual parameters. The redemption values could be modified to see if it affects seller 
strategy. One of our assumptions was that sellers operated in a monopoly, which could give them 
more market power than practical scenarios on the internet. Two person groups might also see a 
different outcome. Also, previous research indicates that buyers are less likely to be sensitive to 
inequity from seller profits if they are competing against others. Another dimension that could be 
examined is how the relationships observed in this study relate to psychological behaviors. For 
instance, future studies could analyze whether specific character traits or psychological profiles 
tend to respond differently to price discrimination. Finally, our study is also limited by its focus 
on short-term behavior. It could be the case that over time, consumers change how they feel 
about price discrimination. 
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APPENDIX 
Seller Instructions – D1 
Today, you will be participating in an economics experiment.  The experiment tests how people 
make decisions involving money.  The decisions you make in this experiment will determine 
your earnings, measured in points, which will be converted to cash and paid at the end of this 
session.  You will make all of these decisions on the computer in front of you.  Please pay 
attention to these instructions so you will understand how to make money. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and the experimenter will quietly answer your 
question.  Please do not talk to any other person during this experiment. 
There will be ten rounds in this experiment. At the beginning of each round, you will be 
randomly matched into groups of three.  Each group will contain one seller and two buyers. 
Sellers will remain sellers throughout all ten rounds; buyers will remain buyers throughout all ten 
rounds. However, the grouping of sellers and buyers will be continually changing throughout the 
ten rounds as sellers and buyers are randomly grouped together at the beginning of each period. 
In each round, the seller will determine a price to offer each buyer for each item. The buyer will 
then determine whether to buy an item. Sellers will receive points equal to the price of each item 
they sell. Buyers will receive points based on their "redemption value" for the item minus the 
price they pay for that item. 
After ten rounds, one round will be randomly selected and buyers and sellers will receive cash 
based on the total number of points they acquire. Points will be converted to cash at a rate of 10 
points=$1. 
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The specific instructions for buyers and sellers are listed below and the specific seller (or buyer) 
instructions will be visible to each seller (or buyer) before the first round.  
Please wait as we assure no one has any questions. 
You have been assigned the role of SELLER. In this experiment, you have been anonymously 
paired with two other participants, who are BUYERS. The identity of either person will not be 
known during or after the experiment. As a seller, you have been given two types of items to sell. 
Your job is to offer a price for each type of item to each buyer. That is, you will choose FOUR 
prices: two prices on each of the two items for each of the two buyers. Then, each price and item 
will be shown to his or her respective buyer. 
Each buyer has the option to buy an item at the price you have offered. The buyer may not buy 
both items, so he or she will buy either one of the items at the price you offered or no items at all. 
If a buyer buys an item, you receive an amount equal to the full price of the item. If the buyer 
chooses not to buy an item, you receive nothing. 
Each buyer has a "redemption value" on each of the two items. At the end of each period, if a 
buyer buys an item he or she will receive a number of points equal to that redemption value. The 
buyer will not receive any points if he or she does not buy any items. 
The interaction will be repeated over several periods. For each period, you will be randomly 
matched with two people and retain your role as a seller. At the end of the experiment, your 
earnings will be calculated by the points you have earned in a randomly selected period. 
The other members of your group have been assigned the role of BUYER. They will be 
presented with the option to buy one of two items from a seller. They have three choices: they 
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may buy the first item, they may buy the second item, or not buy either item. They do not have 
the opportunity to buy both items. 
The buyers will be assigned a redemption value for the item. If they accept an offer, they will 
receive points equal to the redemption value for that item, minus the price they paid for that item. 
For example, if their redemption value is x and the seller offers them a price of y and they accept 
the offer, then they will earn x-y points. If they reject the offer, the seller will receive nothing. 
Sellers will earn points equal to the price of any items they sell. 
Please wait until everyone has heard the instructions and the instructor has given you permission 
to continue. 
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Buyer Instructions – D1 
Today, you will be participating in an economics experiment.  The experiment tests how people 
make decisions involving money.  The decisions you make in this experiment will determine 
your earnings, measured in points, which will be converted to cash and paid at the end of this 
session.  You will make all of these decisions on the computer in front of you.  Please pay 
attention to these instructions so you will understand how to make money. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and the experimenter will quietly answer your 
question.  Please do not talk to any other person during this experiment. 
There will be ten rounds in this experiment. At the beginning of each round, you will be 
randomly matched into groups of three.  Each group will contain one seller and two buyers. 
Sellers will remain sellers throughout all ten rounds; buyers will remain buyers throughout all ten 
rounds. However, the grouping of sellers and buyers will be continually changing throughout the 
ten rounds as sellers and buyers are randomly grouped together at the beginning of each period. 
In each round, the seller will determine a price to offer each buyer for each item. The buyer will 
then determine whether to buy an item. Sellers will receive points equal to the price of each item 
they sell. Buyers will receive points based on their "redemption value" for the item minus the 
price they pay for that item. 
After ten rounds, one round will be randomly selected and buyers and sellers will receive cash 
based on the total number of points they acquire. Points will be converted to cash at a rate of 10 
points=$1. 
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The specific instructions for buyers and sellers are listed below and the specific seller (or buyer) 
instructions will be visible to each seller (or buyer) before the first round.  
Please wait as we assure no one has any questions. 
You have been assigned the role of BUYER. In this experiment, you have been anonymously 
paired with two other participants, of whom one is a SELLER, and the other is another BUYER. 
The identity of either person will not be known during or after the experiment. 
As a buyer, you will be presented with the option to buy one of two items from a seller. You 
have three choices: you may buy the first item, you may buy the second item, or not to buy either 
item. You do not have the opportunity to buy both items. 
You will be assigned a redemption value for the item. If you accept an offer, you will receive 
points equal to your redemption value for that item, minus the price you paid for that item. For 
example, if your redemption value is x and the seller offers you a price of y and you accept the 
offer, then you will earn x-y points. If you reject the offer, you will receive nothing. 
Sellers will earn points equal to the price of any items they sell. 
The interaction will be repeated over several periods. For each period, you will be randomly 
matched with two people and retain your role as a buyer. At the end of the experiment, your 
earnings will be calculated by the points you have earned in a randomly selected period. 
Another person in your group has been assigned the role of SELLER. They will choose FOUR 
prices: two prices on each of the two items for each of the two buyers. Then, each price and item 
will be shown to his or her respective buyer. 
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Each buyer has the option to buy an item at the price the seller offered. The buyer may not buy 
both items, so he or she will buy either one of the items at the price the seller offered or no items 
at all. If a buyer buys an item, the seller receives an amount equal to the full price of the item. If 
the buyer chooses not to buy an item, the seller receives nothing. 
Each buyer has a "redemption value" on each of the two items. At the end of each period, if a 
buyer buys an item he or she will receive a number of points equal to that redemption value. The 
buyer will not receive any points if he or she does not buy any items. 
Please wait until everyone has heard the instructions and the instructor has given you permission 
to continue. 
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Seller Instructions – D3 
Today, you will be participating in an economics experiment.  The experiment tests how people 
make decisions involving money.  The decisions you make in this experiment will determine 
your earnings, measured in points, which will be converted to cash and paid at the end of this 
session.  You will make all of these decisions on the computer in front of you.  Please pay 
attention to these instructions so you will understand how to make money. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and the experimenter will quietly answer your 
question.  Please do not talk to any other person during this experiment. 
There will be ten rounds in this experiment. At the beginning of each round, you will be 
randomly matched into groups of three.  Each group will contain one seller and two buyers. 
Sellers will remain sellers throughout all ten rounds; buyers will remain buyers throughout all ten 
rounds. However, the grouping of sellers and buyers will be continually changing throughout the 
ten rounds as sellers and buyers are randomly grouped together at the beginning of each period. 
In each round, the seller will determine a price to offer each buyer for each item. The buyer will 
then determine whether to buy an item. Sellers will receive points equal to the price of each item 
they sell. Buyers will receive points based on their "redemption value" for the item minus the 
price they pay for that item. 
After ten rounds, one round will be randomly selected and buyers and sellers will receive cash 
based on the total number of points they acquire. Points will be converted to cash at a rate of 10 
points=$1. 
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The specific instructions for buyers and sellers are listed below and the specific seller (or buyer) 
instructions will be visible to each seller (or buyer) before the first round.  
Please wait as we assure no one has any questions. 
You have been assigned the role of SELLER. In this experiment, you have been anonymously 
paired with two other participants, who are BUYERS. The identity of either person will not be 
known during or after the experiment. As a seller, you have been given two types of items to sell. 
Your job is to offer a price for each type of item. That is, you will choose TWO prices: one price 
on each of the two items. Then, each price and item will be shown to each buyer. 
Each buyer has the option to buy an item at the price you have offered. The buyer may not buy 
both items, so he or she will buy either one of the items at the price you offered or no items at all. 
If a buyer buys an item, you receive an amount equal to the full price of the item. If the buyer 
chooses not to buy an item, you receive nothing. 
Each buyer has a "redemption value" on each of the two items. At the end of each period, if a 
buyer buys an item he or she will receive a number of points equal to that redemption value. The 
buyer will not receive any points if he or she does not buy any items. 
The interaction will be repeated over several periods. For each period, you will be randomly 
matched with two people and retain your role as a seller. At the end of the experiment, your 
earnings will be calculated by the points you have earned in a randomly selected period. 
The other members of your group have been assigned the role of BUYER. They will be 
presented with the option to buy one of two items from a seller. They have three choices: they 
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may buy the first item, they may buy the second item, or not buy either item. They do not have 
the opportunity to buy both items. 
The buyers will be assigned a redemption value for each item. If they accept an offer, they will 
receive points equal to the redemption value for that item, minus the price they paid for that item. 
For example, if their redemption value is x and the seller offers them a price of y and they accept 
the offer, then they will earn x-y points. If they reject the offer, the seller will receive nothing. 
Sellers will earn points equal to the price of any items they sell. 
Please wait until everyone has heard the instructions and the instructor has given you permission 
to continue. 
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Buyer Instructions – D3 
Today, you will be participating in an economics experiment.  The experiment tests how people 
make decisions involving money.  The decisions you make in this experiment will determine 
your earnings, measured in points, which will be converted to cash and paid at the end of this 
session.  You will make all of these decisions on the computer in front of you.  Please pay 
attention to these instructions so you will understand how to make money. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and the experimenter will quietly answer your 
question.  Please do not talk to any other person during this experiment. 
There will be ten rounds in this experiment. At the beginning of each round, you will be 
randomly matched into groups of three.  Each group will contain one seller and two buyers. 
Sellers will remain sellers throughout all ten rounds; buyers will remain buyers throughout all ten 
rounds. However, the grouping of sellers and buyers will be continually changing throughout the 
ten rounds as sellers and buyers are randomly grouped together at the beginning of each period. 
In each round, the seller will determine a price to offer each buyer for each item. The buyer will 
then determine whether to buy an item. Sellers will receive points equal to the price of each item 
they sell. Buyers will receive points based on their "redemption value" for the item minus the 
price they pay for that item. 
After ten rounds, one round will be randomly selected and buyers and sellers will receive cash 
based on the total number of points they acquire. Points will be converted to cash at a rate of 10 
points=$1. 
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The specific instructions for buyers and sellers are listed below and the specific seller (or buyer) 
instructions will be visible to each seller (or buyer) before the first round.  
Please wait as we assure no one has any questions. 
You have been assigned the role of BUYER. In this experiment, you have been anonymously 
paired with two other participants, of whom one is a SELLER, and the other is another BUYER. 
The identity of either person will not be known during or after the experiment. 
As a buyer, you will be presented with the option to buy one of two items from a seller. You 
have three choices: you may buy the first item, you may buy the second item, or not to buy either 
item. You do not have the opportunity to buy both items. 
You will be assigned a redemption value for the item. If you accept an offer, you will receive 
points equal to your redemption value for that item, minus the price you paid for that item. For 
example, if your redemption value is x and the seller offers you a price of y and you accept the 
offer, then you will earn x-y points. If you reject the offer, you will receive nothing. 
Sellers will earn points equal to the price of any items they sell. 
The interaction will be repeated over several periods. For each period, you will be randomly 
matched with two people and retain your role as a buyer. At the end of the experiment, your 
earnings will be calculated by the points you have earned in a randomly selected period. 
Another person in your group has been assigned the role of SELLER. They will choose TWO 
prices: one price on each of the two items. Then, each price and item will be shown to each 
buyer. 
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Each buyer has the option to buy an item at the price the seller offered. The buyer may not buy 
both items, so he or she will buy either one of the items at the price the seller offered or no items 
at all. If a buyer buys an item, the seller receives an amount equal to the full price of the item. If 
the buyer chooses not to buy an item, the seller receives nothing. 
Each buyer has a "redemption value" on each of the two items. At the end of each period, if a 
buyer buys an item he or she will receive a number of points equal to that redemption value. The 
buyer will not receive any points if he or she does not buy any items. 
Please wait until everyone has heard the instructions and the instructor has given you permission 
to continue. 
